Our government comprises three branches: the executive, responsible for setting the lawmaking agenda; the legislature, tasked with creating policies; and the judiciary, ensuring a check on overreach by holding everyone accountable. In theory, these branches are supposed to be separate with some autonomy. However, in Belize, policy primarily originates from the Cabinet, and the judiciary is the only branch with significant power to challenge a law. Despite the existence of a nominal senate, its power and composition are limited. The longstanding concentration of power in the Cabinet has been a notable concern, as highlighted in the Political Reform Commission’s 2000 Report. This article explores the concept of limiting the Cabinet’s power and examines potential challenges associated with such reforms.

The Problem with the Cabinet and Section 59 (2) (e)

The 2000 Report notes that it is “obvious that legislative power really lies in the Cabinet and not in the Legislature.” Indeed, this is so almost by design. The Cabinet “exercises executive authority and de facto legislative power.” A consequence of this concentration is that “Ministers are viewed as demi-gods, and getting power attendant to ministerial office is the ultimate goal of most candidates in national elections.” It is easy to think that this is just a consequence of having a Parliamentary system, but that is not the case. In many parliamentary systems, the House has more power to influence policy.

This concentration of power is further complicated by Section 59(2)(e) of the constitution, which states that a member shall vacate his seat “if, having been a candidate of a political party and elected to the House of Representatives as a candidate of that political party, he resigns from that political party or crosses the floor.” The 2000 report notes that the definition of crossing the floor can include some or all of the following elements:

1. Resigning from a political party,

2. Joining another party,

3. Voting against their political party without party permission,

4. Abstaining from voting with their political party without permission.

It should be noted that the constitution does not define what is included in the definition of “crossing the floor,” so Section 59(2)(e) may be interpreted as meaning that area representatives cannot vote against their party without vacating their seat. If this is the case, even if you reform the Cabinet, it would not make a single difference since area representatives would have to vote in line with whatever legislation the Cabinet releases.

The difference between the Belizean Legislature and other Westminster countries is the lower amount of seats in the Legislature. The Government of Belize currently has 18 Ministries while the legislature has 31 seats. While increasing the number of seats is an option that Belizeans may consider, other suggestions have been made.

Fixing How Ministers are Appointed

One suggestion for limiting the power of the executive has been to allow members of the general public to be Ministers. This would offer a few potential benefits. The first is that it increases the pool of qualified people that the Prime Minister can appoint to preside over a ministry. The second is that it would improve the separation of powers, as fewer or no area representatives would be Ministers. Reducing the number of area representatives with Ministerial Rank would also allow them to focus on representing the people who voted for them. There are also arguments against this proposal. An unelected Minister is not accountable to voters. For many, voting for an area representative is equivalent to voting for a Minister. It is also worth noting that members of the general public can already be appointed to Ministerial rank by being a Senator.

The 2000 Commission did not agree with the arguments in favor of changing how ministers are appointed. Dylan Vernon and Carolyn Trench Sandiford seem to be the only two commissioners who agreed with the proposal. Vernon wrote in his dissenting opinion that “The key functions of the legislature are to represent the interests of the electorate, develop laws and policies for the nation, and to have oversight over the executive. It is clear to me that the legislature in Belize is performing none of these well.” He notes that in most cases “the Prime Minister and Cabinet inevitably get their way.” He suggested having the Prime Minister appoint members of the general public would not only increase separation of power but would also improve the quality of ministers. The idea of appointing Ministers from outside the legislature is not new. In the United States, heads of departments are appointed by the President.

Limiting the Number of Area Representatives Who can be Minister

To further address the concentration of power, another viable recommendation involves limiting the number of area representatives eligible for Cabinet appointments. The 2000 Commission proposed amending section 40 of the constitution, suggesting that no more than 40% of the National Assembly be appointed to the Cabinet. The rationale behind this recommendation is to bolster the separation of powers, allowing the Prime Minister a larger pool of elected officials to potentially replace Ministers. This adjustment could also contribute to diminishing the perception that the Cabinet is indistinguishable from the Legislature.

Concluding Thoughts

In conclusion, the analysis of Belize’s governance structure reveals a deeply rooted issue – the disproportionate concentration of power within the Cabinet. The observation that legislative power effectively resides in the Cabinet rather than the Legislature, as highlighted by the 2000 Report, underscores the urgency for systemic change. This concentration not only elevates Ministers to an almost divine status but also hampers the Legislature’s ability to fulfill its essential functions of representing the electorate and developing laws and policies for the nation.

The proposed solutions, such as allowing members of the general public to become Ministers and limiting the number of area representatives in the Cabinet, present viable avenues for reform. However, the inherent challenges and counterarguments, notably the question of accountability for unelected Ministers, emphasize the need for a nuanced and comprehensive approach. The dissenting opinion of commissioners Dylan Vernon and Carolyn Trench Sandiford sheds light on the Legislature’s struggles to maintain its oversight role, raising critical questions about the effectiveness of the current system.

The examination of Section 59(2)(e) adds another layer of complexity, suggesting potential limitations on the autonomy of area representatives. Even with reforms to the Cabinet, the interpretation of this section may constrain representatives from voting against their party, highlighting the intricate web of challenges woven into the fabric of Belize’s political landscape. Ultimately, this exploration serves as a clarion call for a thorough reevaluation of the Cabinet’s powers, urging a commitment to a governance model that ensures accountability, representation, and a more robust democratic system.